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T
his paper discusses the development of a practical Concept Risk Assessment tool for
use in new offshore oil and gas developments. The methodology is commercially
con® dential and so the detail cannot be described fully, although a general outline of
the main constituent elements can be given. This tool has been veri® ed against detailed
Quanti® ed Risk Assessments (QRA) and shows an agreement of 6 30% in key risk parameters
but with the bene® t of taking only about 5% of the time to complete.
The tool has been used to assist in the selection of the best concept for around six new North
Sea oil, gas and condensate developments. The novelty is that the risk assessment is based on a
number of pre-processed risk building blocks for each item of hazardous equipment. These are
then moderated by gearing factors to take account of speci® c aspects of the design. The speed
with which the tool can be utilized, allied with its relative accuracy, allows the rapid ranking of
the wide range of concept options that are typical of many new offshore developments. In
addition, the tool enables the rapid re-assessment of risk levels which may change as a result of
the ongoing evolution of the design. This means that safety of personnel can be given a high
focus during project evolution.
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INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the oil and gas industry on the UK
continental shelf over the last ten years has been in¯ uenced
by a number of forces:
· The changes in the regulatory regime;
· The nature of the reservoirs now available for development;
· The availability of new technology;
· The need to be more cost effective in the light of
increasing competition for development funds.
These factors are discussed in turn below.
One of the most signi® cant events in the worldwide
offshore oil and gas industry occurred on 6 July 1988 with
the Piper Alpha Disaster1. In the UK, this resulted in a
change from prescriptive to goal-setting regulation.The ® rst
set of regulations, the Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations2 , required that operators assess among other
things the Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency
(TRIF). Many operators also have their own criteria for
assessing risk and its tolerability, including parameters such
as individual risk, which complement TRIF.
The nature of the oil reservoirs currently being developed
re¯ ects the fact that the large accumulations east of
ShetlandÐ such as Brent, Forties and NinianÐ have already
been developed and it is unlikely that there will be many, if
any, more of that size. The available reserves are generally
smaller in size and more widely distributed. There are,
however, new frontiers west of Shetland where there are
sizeable accumulationsof hydrocarbons. There are also new
deep, high pressure and high temperature (HP/HT)
accumulations largely located in the Central North Sea.
New technology has dramatically changed the nature of
offshore installations. It is not possible to even attempt an
overview here although some examples can be given. New
technology has allowed location and exploitation of HP/HT
accumulations and there is more extensive use of subsea
developments. The multi-phase transport of ¯ uids in
pipelines has permitted the linking of many accumulations
into one Central Processing Facility (CPF); in-® eld
pipelines in excess of 25 km are possible. Deeper water
drilling with jack-up drilling rigs in water depths up to
120m is now possible and increasing use is being made of
Floating Production Systems (FPS) based on monohull
(ship-shaped) vessels or semi-submersible vessels. All of
these innovations mean that the risk to personnel from any
new design is not readily assessed by reference to previous
experience.
Against this backdrop of change there is increasing
pressure for new developments to be economic as new oil
and gas producing regions become available. The resulting
competition for development funds requires North Sea
developments to achieve the necessary higher levels of
safety whilst achieving better economic performance.
BACKGROUND
It is instructive to consider the main elements in a typical
offshore production installation:
Drilling
This could be by an integrated drilling rig, a jack-up, a
semi-submersible, a rig skidded off a jack-up or Tender
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Assisted Drilling where all services and the mud systems are
carried on a ¯ oating structure but the drilling is on the main
structure.
Structure
This could be a steel or concrete structure which might be
® xed to the seabed or be buoyant.
Transportation
The ¯ uids can be transported to the shore by pipeline or
stored offshore with loading to a shuttle tanker.
Facilities
The facilities include some or all of accommodation for
personnel, utilities and the production facilities. The last of
these can be subdivided into:
· Subsea developments where the X-mas trees are on the
seabed.
· Normally Unattended Installations (NUI) where the X-
mas trees are above the seabed and remotely controlled.
Normally there is only minimal equipment in addition to the
trees, involving some manifolding and possibly separation
facilities.
· Fully manned facilities typically involving a number of
stages of oil, gas and water separation as well as gas
compression and dehydration.
A more detailed explanation is given in3 .
With all of the options available the number of design
permutations can be quite considerable. It is self evident that
an offshore development can never be completely safe but the
degree of inherent safety can be increased by the selection of
the optimumdesign in terms of installation/® eld con® guration
and layout which reduces the risk to a level that is As LowAs
is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) without resorting to
costly protective systems. This requires the identi® cation of
the major risk contributors4 and their assessment by some
form of Quanti® ed Risk Assessment (QRA) early in the
project life cycle. If the structured approach of identi® cation
and assessment is not carried out early in the project life it is
possible that the `engineering judgement’ approachwill fail to
identify all of the major risks and that loss prevention
expenditure will be targeted in areas where there is little
bene® t. This has been found to result in the need for expensive
remedial actions late on in the project life.
Given the number of potential design options it would not
be possible, due to time and resource constraints, to develop
all of the options to the point where a detailed QRA study
could be carried out. This would be particularly so during
the early phases of a project where the design will often
change as a result of economic drivers, partner requirements
or other external in¯ uences. These issues have driven
development of the rapid screening tool described here
which permits risk assessment of many design options in a
methodical, consistent and auditable manner thereby
reducing front-end design costs and permitting the targeting
of design effort in the most cost-effective and safety-
oriented manner. This is particularly important in the
current regulatory regime which requires demonstration of
ALARP as part of the Safety Case.
Alternative Ranking Tools
There are already ranking tools such as the Dow Index5 .
In fact the ® rst approach to development of the ranking tool,
as early as 1990, was to follow and/or to modify the Dow
approach to de® ne the base line. However, this was more
dif® cult than ® rst anticipated. The Dow Index addresses a
whole group of chemicals in a balanced manner and derives
the Maximum Probable Daily Outage (MPDO) and
Maximum Probable Property Damage (MPD) which are
not appropriate offshore. An examination of the risk
elements of an offshore oil and gas development showed
that there were other signi® cant elements such as drilling
wells which would not ® t naturally with the Dow Index.
This of course is not a criticism of the Dow Index which is a
well-respected ranking tool but is more appropriate to the
chemical industry.
There are other ranking tools that have been used in the
past or are being used but to the authors’ knowledge all
share the drawback in this context that they do not apply
well to offshore operations.
In dismissing existing tools it is as well to be clear about
the requirements for the particular application under
consideration here. A risk ranking tool for application in
the offshore environment will broadly have to deal with the
following types of issue:
· Helicopter travel;
· Occupational risks (e.g., slips, trips and falls);
· Structural failure through ship collision, storm, seismic
activity and other causes;
· The immediate effects of a hydrocarbon incident (e.g.,
through thermal radiation threat to personnel in the
vicinity);
· Escape from the hydrocarbon incident to the Temporary
Refuge (TR);
· Impairment of the TR (rendering it unsafe to remain
there);
· Escape from the TR by lifeboat or helicopter.
A fuller description is given in Reference 3.
THE MODEL
Overview
The time and effort required to complete a full QRA of an
offshore installation is a function of the complexity/size of
the installation and in the extreme could require many
months of effort spread over a prolonged period. This
timescale precludes support of the rapidly changing design
which is a feature of the concept development phase.
However, experience of conducting large numbers of
detailed risk assessments indicates that the overall results
tend to be driven by a relatively modest number of key
parameters. The main variables are to be found in the
number of wells drilled, how they are drilled and the type of
¯ uid in the reservoir; the number of items of process
equipment and their relative position; and the process ¯ uids
and pressure at which they are handled. These variables are
obviously fairly complex and have to be simpli® ed to be
handled by the ranking tool. Other features of the risk
picture are relatively straightforward and their inclusion
requires little simpli® cation. An example of this latter
category would be the risks associated with helicopter
transport.
In respect of hydrocarbon risk, the ® rst step was to
examine both the range of typical process pressures and the
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possibility of grouping these into a number of more
manageable bands. The second step was to examine the
number of potential leak sources on any typical piece of
equipment. The ® rst step revealed that the range of process
pressures could be reasonably assigned to four bands. The
second step showed that the numbers of ® ttings on any piece
of equipment were fairly typical for most installations.
These observations lead to the concept of `Pre-processed
Data’ . For each vessel/equipment item typical leak
frequencies were derived. Out¯ ow modelling was then
conducted for each of the four pressure bands. Out¯ ow
modelling is fairly straightforward for different ¯ uids and
pressures, gases can be treated by the standard compressible
¯ ow equations and ¯ ashing ¯ uids can be modelled by a
modi® ed homogenous equilibrium method6 . The ignition
probability can be de® ned from the out¯ ow rates by a simple
equation which combines elements for static ignition and
other sources of ignition. This model can be veri® ed against
large leaks such as blowouts and smaller leaks7 .
Immediate Fatality
With this information it is possible to de® ne leak size and
frequency for any piece of equipment and from this the
ignited leak frequency. With a known population density it
is possible to assess the likely fatalities per year for those in
the immediate vicinity of the equipment. All of these data
are de® ned on a series of pre-processed `look up tables’ . The
data in these tables cover the following equipment as a
function of pressure:
· Vessels - separators - others;
· Heat exchangers;
· Pumps;
· Metering skids;
· Risers/pipelines;
· Production manifold;
· Drilling a well - blowout;
· Workover on a well;
· Producing well.
Examples of this type of data are given in Table 1.
Delayed Fatality
The next step is to consider how ignited events can lead to
so-called delayed fatality. These are fatalities that arise from
impairment of the TR. They may occur during the process of
evacuating the installation by lifeboat or they may occur
because personnel perish within the TR having been unable
to evacuate.
The key is thus to determine the frequency of TR
impairment and the associated conditional probability of
Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC)
impairment. The initial premise was that, at the level of detail
required of the ranking tool, a ratio could be de® ned which
links ignited event frequencywith TR impairment frequency.
Clearly the TR impairment ratio must be in¯ uenced by ® rstly
the type of event and secondly the design of the installation.
Three event categorieswere de® ned and a series of associated
important design features associated with each. Examples of
these are listed in Table 2.
Review of previous QRAs and some fundamental
analysis work allowed derivation of the TR impairment
ratio according to the design features on a given installation.
An example is given in Table 3 for process events on a
typical ® rst generation production installation.
Thus for a process-related ignited event frequency of
3.4´10± 2 per annum the TR impairment frequency would
be 0.029´3.4x10± 2 =9.9´10± 4 per annum.
A similar approach is taken for conditional probability of
TEMPSC impairment.
It should be noted that assignment of the TR and
TEMPSC impairment values is both critical to the process
and not entirely without a degree of subjectivity. The latter
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Table 1
Equipment Pressure range, bar Ignited event frequency, per annum Immediate fatality frequency, fatalities per annum
Separator (gas) 0±3 2.8´10-4 2.8´10-5
3±30 7.7´10-4 9.8´10-5
30±300 1.8´10-3 2.9´10-4
Pump (oil) 0±3 4.7´10-5 2.0´10-5
3±30 6.4´10-5 4.2´10-5
30±300 2.2´10-4 1.4´10-4
Table 2
Process events Riser events Blowout events
Inventory Pipeline size Horizontal distance to TR
Structural redundancy Pipeline contents High level/low level TR
Passive ® re protection SSIV TR protection
TR position Sub-structure type Water cut
TR Protection
Blast walls
Explosion overpressures
TR leak tightness
Smokey inventories
Collapsing structures
Table 3
Feature Rating
Inventory 0.003
Structural redundancy 0.001
Passive ® re protection 0.010
TR position 0.001
TR protection 0.001
Blast walls 0.003
Explosion overpressures 0.003
TR leak tightness 0.003
Smokey inventories 0.003
Collapsing structures 0.001
TOTAL 0.029
feature is a part of detailed QRA and must also be
recognized to be a feature of any rapid ranking tool. It
follows therefore that the experience of the analyst is vital.
Experience recognizes when subjective judgements are
being made and understands what the in¯ uence of these is
likely to be. Such understanding in turn allows proper
interpretation of the results.
Non-Hydrocarbon Events
Such events encompass occupational risk, helicopter risk
and structural collapse risk (through a variety of causes).
These are relatively easily assigned risk estimates even at
the conceptual phase. They do not tend to drive the concept
selection process (although there are some exceptions to
this) but are required to enable full understanding of the risk
picture.
Using the Model
The model can be run on a PC but for reasons of
auditability and visibility it is often preferred that it is
carried out on prepared worksheets which can be indepen-
dently checked.
These worksheets cover:
· Data collection;
· Ignited event frequency;
· Individual risk from immediate effects;
· TR impairment due to hydrocarbon events;
· Individual risk due to TR impairment;
· Individual risk due to evacuation;
· Occupational and helicopter risk;
· Structural risk;
· Overall riskÐ individual;
· Overall riskÐ societal.
The sheets differ for various types of installation as
follows:
· Conventional installations;
· Subsea installations;
· Normally unattended installations;
· Tanker based installations.
The assessment of the three parameters below can now be
derived:
· Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF);
· Individual Risk Per Annum by work groups (IRPA);
· Potential Loss of Life over the ® eld life (PLL).
The last parameter can be used to assess whether changes in
the design aimed at reducing risk can be justi® ed on the
basis of cost, the reduction in PLL and corporate criteria on
cost bene® t.
Environmental Risk
The modelling of the risk to the environment is, globally,
semi-qualitative. But the impact from CO2 /CO/SOx /NOx
can be assessed for any design concept.
The impact from oil on drill cuttings, oil in produced
water, and oil in other ef¯ uent can also be assessed from
rules. The oil spills can be assessed knowing the leak
frequency and the design intent of the drainage system. Oil
spillage from transportation can be derived from the mode
of transport and the types of tankers involved.
These environmental aspects have not yet been applied
to a real development but the tool is ready for its ® rst
application. It is recognized that a major dif® culty will be
in offsetting one type of environmental threat against
another.
160 CRAWLEY and GRANT
Trans IChemE, Vol 75, Part B, August 1997
Figure 1. Concept Risk Assessment parameter map. (Drilling option: jack-up. Drilling programme: 1 well per year.
Criteria
The twin criteria of TRIF and IRPA produce a two-
dimensionalmap within which risk-based decisions must be
made. Guidance on TRIF is given in Reference 2 but by
convention assessment of the tolerability of IRPA is derived
from Reference 8. These can be shown graphically on the
Concept Risk Assessment parameter map shown in Figure 1.
This allows useful input into the decisions as to which
option is chosen.
VERIFICATION OF THE MODEL
It must be recognized that QRA can never be truly
veri® ed against reality. Nevertheless for the ranking tool to
have credibility it was deemed vital that some form of
comparison exercise was undertaken. It was therefore
applied to a series of 11 installations of various types for
which detailed QRAs were already available. The results are
shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). Agreement to within about
30% is seen which in the overall context of the accuracy of
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Figure 2(a ). Concept ranking assessment methodology/QRA comparison. Results of veri® cation study. (b) Concept ranking assessment methodology/QRA
comparison. Results of veri® cation study.
QRA is judged reasonable. Note that this relates to absolute
values whereas trends will be predicted more accurately. As
the main application of the methodology is in comparing
options, this distinction is important.
The comparison exercise considered detailed QRAs
conducted by consultants other than WS Atkins. Neither
were these QRAs used for derivation of the key parameters
in the ranking tool. The comparison exercise was thus
believed to be free from untoward bias.
CASE STUDY
Overview
During 1994 the methodology was applied to the Eastern
Trough Area Project (ETAP). This was a particularly
challenging task as ETAP is a complex development
encompassing a number of separate ® elds. The broad
development concept was that production from a series of
outlying ® elds would be routed to a CPF located over the
Marnock ® eld and operated by BP Exploration. The initial
number of ® elds would be seven, rising to nine as process
capacity became available.
There were judged to be ® ve principal variables that
would in¯ uence the risk levels of the various options as
follows:
· Development concept: the manner in which hydrocarbons
are routed to CPF; whether gas injection is required;
whether outlying ® elds are subsea, normally unattended or
permanently manned;
· CPF con® guration: the type of sub-structure and whether
a one, two or three platform arrangement is employed;
· Drilling programme: the extent to which in-® ll drilling
will be required;
· Drilling facility type: whether drilling conducted during
the production phase is by jack-up or platform-based rig;
arrangements for accommodating the drill crew;
· Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV) ® tment: whether SSIVs
are to be ® tted on subsea lines at the CPF.
The options which were under consideration for each of
these variables are discussed brie¯ y below.
Development Concept
Some 11 cases were under consideration covering
variations on:
· Various satellites subsea or normally unattended or
permanently manned;
· Gas injection to satellite ® elds or not;
· Various con® gurations of routing satellite production to
the CPF directly or via other satellites.
CPF Con® guration
The basic options were as follows:
· Integrated PUQDR steel jacket platform (P=Process,
U=Utilities, Q=Quarters, D=Drilling, R=Risers);
· QU+ PDR (bridge linked) steel jacket platforms;
· QU, PD+ R steel jacket platforms;
· QUPD + R steel jacket platforms;
· QU, P+ DR steel jacket platforms;
· concrete sub-structure options for all or some of the CPF
sub-structures;
· jack-up sub-structure with either PUQDR, PUQD + R or
PUQ+ DR layout. For the latter two cases the riser or riser/
drilling platform would be a conventional steel jacket.
Drilling Programme and Facilities
Three drilling programme variants were possible invol-
ving no in-® ll drilling, moderate in-® ll drilling or maximum
in-® ll drilling.
Drilling at the CPF would either be by jack-up or
integrated drilling. In the latter case a further sensitivity
involved accommodating drill crew on the platform or a
¯ otel.
Number of Concepts
Not all possible variations of the parameters discussed
above were feasible but those remaining were suf® cient to
yield over 1000 possible options. This emphasizes the need
for the Concept Risk Assessment methodology to be applied
ef® ciently and quickly.
RESULTS
Space does not permit a full results presentation here. An
indication of the type of results achieved and how they were
used to in¯ uence concept selection can be gained in the ® rst
instance by reference to the parameter map shown as
Figure 1. Full listing of PLL, IRPA and TRIF are of course
162 CRAWLEY and GRANT
Trans IChemE, Vol 75, Part B, August 1997
Figure 3. Eastern Trough Area Project central processing facility.
also available broken down as required by hazard cause and
operational phase.
Many issues were identi® ed by application of the
methodology. One of the most important was that the CPF
is seen to most likely have tolerable risks for the case where
risers (R) are on a different platform for the living quarters
(Q). Whilst it would normally be unusual for riser risk to
drive the need for two (or three) platform layout, the number
of risers coming on to the CPF suggested strongly that this
should be the case.
The power of the methodology was to focus attention on
the issue at the very earliest stages of facility development,
thereby permitting sensible design solutions to be identi® ed.
Without the methodology it is possible that this issue, whilst
probably being recognized, would be ranked along with a
number of other competing but less critical problems.
Various alternative solutions to the riser problem were
considered, such as SSIV ® tment. In the end, however, a
dual QU-PDR platform solution was chosen as it had
economic advantages as well as effectively controlling riser
risk by separating the bulk of the personnel on the QU and
jack-up from the hazard. The proposed QU-PDR layout is
shown in Figure 3. Risers are located to the east end of the
PDR platform. The layout treated the jack-up and QU
platform in a balanced manner and is seen to maximize
physical separation of personnel on the QU platform and the
jack-up from the major hazard source (the risers) both by
separation and orientation.
It is believed that this example of how application of the
methodology was in¯ uential in the selection of the concept
and in providing focus on the safety issues in the
development of a major project carries a number of
messages. The methodology was successful in focusing
attention on the important issues. Quanti® cation always
helps in assessment of a problem; this applies even if the
quanti® cation is coarse, as long as suitable allowance is
made for the likely error bands.
By focusing on the key risk drivers at an early stage and
imposing an early visibility to the issues it was possible to
maximize the element of inherent safety. This meant that
there was a better understanding of the safety issues prior to
front-end engineering design such that the workscope for
the design was less dependent on safety systems to deliver
risk levels that were as low as is reasonably practicable.
DISCUSSION
The development of the Concept Risk Assessment model
has taken around 1000 man-hours, but the speed with which
it can be used allows many concepts to be examined and
ranked in a few weeks. It has centred on using the skills of
risk analysts to make it easy to use while still giving sensible
answers. The pre-processing concept has greatly reduced
the need for repetitive calculations, increasing work
accuracy, consistency and ef® ciency.
One of the conclusions which has been derived is that
QRAs can be simpli® ed greatly at the concept development
stage. The use of a structured hazard identi® cation study4
along with the ranking tool described has allowed designs to
be developed with safety incorporated at the concept
selection phase.
The approach has now been used to rank concepts for at
least six future offshore developments, and has permitted
® ne tuning of the design at the concept stage which in turn
has led to a solid demonstration of ALARP in the Design
Safety Case.
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